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The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad
Business of Unlimited Patent Protection
for Methods of Doing Business
Leo J. Raskind*
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit’s recent endorsement of patent protection
for methods of doing business marks so sweeping a departure from
precedent as to invite a search for its justification.1 Unfortunately,
this quest cannot usefully begin with a review of the prior precedents, for a coherent analysis of the denial of patent protection for
business methods—the so-called “business method exception”—
was not developed in the earlier cases. Those courts essentially
rested their denials of claims for business method patents on the
ipse dixit that patent protection was limited to technology, i.e., to
tangible things and to physical procedures. Business method
claims were treated as falling below the threshold of statutory subject matter. Some of those claims were rejected on traditional
grounds of lack of novelty and non-obviousness, although many
opinions recited the business method exception.2
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the
constructive comments and suggestions of Richard H. Stern and Victor Zowana. This
paper was originally delivered on March 25, 1999 at a symposium on intellectual property rights in computer-related technology at The George Washington University Law
School, cosponsored by Oracle Corporation.
1. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908)
(stating dictum that a method of doing business is ineligible for patent protection). After
Hotel Security, however, two patents on business methods were upheld in terms of the
physical structure implementing the method. See Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange
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The Federal Circuit has now flatly rejected the business
method exception.3 However, the recent decision which announced this startling conclusion provides neither explanation,
limitation, nor rationale.4 What is clear and unqualified is that
business methods are now statutory subject matter in full parity
with other innovative activity.5 As Judge Rich put it:
We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception
to rest. Since its inception, the “business method” exception has merely represented the application of some general, but no longer applicable legal principal. . . . Since the
1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should
have been, subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.6
Whether the prior doctrine was ill-conceived and whether there
are public interest or economic policy foundations for now extending patent protection to business methods is the topic of this paper.
Scrip-Book Co. 187 F. 984 (7th Cir. 1911) (holding a coupon book of travel units patentable); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913) (holding a railroad
coupon book with detachable parts patentable); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A.
1934) (denying protection to “an ingenious and convenient arrangement” to transfer
funds as lacking the requisite “physical structure”); In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A.
1934) (holding a process of communicating contract terms and recording their acceptance
held unpatentable.); In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (denying a patent for a
fire-protection system); Loew’s Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters, Inc., 174
F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949) (holding unpatentable a scheme for parking automobiles in an
open lot); Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1819 (Bd. Pat. App. 1988) (holding an
accounting analysis of expenses held an unpatentable method of doing business); In re
Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,296 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (rejecting patent for
a method of competitive bidding on many items). However, a patent was issued on a financial service method of combining a margin brokerage account with money market
funds and a checking/charge account in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1358 (D.Del. 1983). The leading treatises also recognize the business method exception. See D.S. CHISUM, 1 PATENTS §
1.03[5] & § 1.02 [4] (1998) (noting that the “printed matter” exception had served as an
alternative ground of denial of business method patents); See also, Lewis v. Pennsylvania
Steel Co., 59 F. 129 (3d Cir. 1893); Louis Koutoulakos, Note, The Patentability of
Printed Matter: A Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475 (1950); P.D.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.02[3][b] (2d ed. 1997).
3. See State Street Bank,149 F.3d at 1374.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1375 (emphasis added).
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Other papers in this Symposium will probe the reasoning and use
of precedent in the State Street Bank opinion, the requisite adjustments in interpretation of the Patent Statute to implement this directive, the possibility of legislative implementation, and role of
the Patent Office in administering this new protection for business
methods.7
This paper addresses the justification of patent protection for
methods of doing business by posing two questions. First, what
guidance, if any, does economic analysis offer to support the new
rule on the patentability of business methods? Second, how does
this extension of proprietary rights directly to marketplace practices affect competition? This latter inquiry, in turn, requires some
consideration of the traditional interface between patent rights and
the antitrust laws.8 Although the opinion in the State Street Bank
case makes no mention of the competitive impact of this new extension of protectible subject matter, there is a settled line of case
law subjecting patent licensing practices to judicial scrutiny under
the doctrine of patent misuse.9

7. The Patent Office has hired new examiners with Business School training to process the rising volume of business method patents. A “Boom” in Business Method Patent
Filings Has Followed State Street Banking Ruling, PTO Says, ELEC. COMMERCE & L.
REP. (BNA) 1393 (Dec. 16, 1998); see also, infra text accompanying notes 12-14.
8. The impact of patent protection on competition has traditionally subjected patent
licensing and related practices to antitrust scrutiny. Justice Black noted, “The grant of a
patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly. . . .” Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 229 (1964). Recently the antitrust enforcement agencies have noted the potential for patent practices to generate impediments to competition as follows: “Intellectual
property law. . .[patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secret law] bestows on the
owners. . .certain rights to exclude others. . . . [A]s with other forms of private property,
certain types of conduct with respect to intellectual property may have anticompetitive
effects against which the antitrust laws can and do protect.
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP.1708 at S-3 (April 13, 1995).
9. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873) (finding patent misuse for patentee to impose territorial limits); Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (finding patent misuse to tie purchase of an unpatented product
to patent use); see also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (recognizing patent misuse as a valid defense against a patent infringement claim). Misuse
has also been extended to copyrighted material. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210
U.S. 339 (1908) (finding it misuse to set minimum resale price); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v.
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding anticompetitive license clauses to be
misuse). See also Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional
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These questions are addressed initially by reviewing the economic analysis of the role and function of patents as a possible
economic footing for the grant of patent protection to methods of
doing business. To state the conclusion in advance of an offer of
proof, the economic analysis of patent protection does not support
the extension of patent protection to methods of doing business.
Both economic theory and empirical studies of patent-intensive industries cast doubt on the premise that patent protection of business methods is required either as an incentive for innovation or as
an ingredient of the efficient diffusion of business methods in the
economy. Indeed, there is a case to be made against such extension of patent protection. Recent examples in the current boom in
such claims suggest the need for caution and restraint on the part of
both the PTO and courts. For example, Patent No. 5,761,857 was
recently issued to two architects for their configuration of residential housing.10 In place of a traditional hallway connecting the several rooms and apartments, these patentees applied staircases external to the structure.11
While architectural design does not readily leap to mind as an
example of a method of doing business, this patent does raise the
question of definition. On what ground should it be excluded from
the characterization as a business method? Like the business
method cases decided under the exception prior to State Street
Bank, the design of a structure could be characterized as the delivery of a method of organizing space.12 Similarly, Henry Ford’s assembly line method of organizing production might also be characterized as a method of doing the business of automobile
production.13 Aside from the definitional question inherent in patCopyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401 (1994); Scott A. Miskimon, Note,
Divorcing Public Policy from Economic Reality: The Fourth Circuit’s Copyright Misuse
Doctrine in Lasercomb America Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1672 (1991); Note,
Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First
Amendment Values, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1991); but see, Mark A. Lemley, Comment,
The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990).
10. See Teresa Riordan, Architects Debate Concepts Behind Housing Design, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 1999, at C11.
11. Id.
12. See Loew’s Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir. 1949).
13. JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1990)
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enting business methods, this patent shares with patent claims to
methods of retailing and distributing goods and services, the problem of locating the prior art. Like many commercial practices,
some architectural features have their roots in antiquity—in the
Great Pyramids, the Roman Aqueducts, and the Parthenon—for
example. Doubtless, it was this and related issues of the scope of
patent protection that led a trade association involved with architects to the reaction described in the newspaper account of this patent, which states, “These patents (sic) have raised concerns among
builders and architects. The National Association of Home Builders, for example, has established a task force to address the question of architectural patents.”14 Patent 857 underscores also the
potential for over-inclusive patent protection.15
Comparison with the Copyright Act illustrates this point for, in
addition to patent protection, architectural designs may be protected by copyright. Unlike the patent statute, the Copyright Act
expressly limits the scope of copyright protection of architectural
works to the creative elements that meet the copyright standard of
“originality.”16 Accordingly, the Copyright Act limits the scope of
protection of architectural works to “overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design,
but does not include individual standard features.”17 It is likely
that the task force convened by the National Association of Homebuilders will express their concern over the use of standard features.
Another recent patent, No. 5,926,796, which most persons
would consider to describe a business method, poses kindred questions.18 This latter patent has been issued for a computerized

(recounting improvements in assembly line production of automobiles made in Japan).
14. See Riordan, supra note 10 at C11.
15. See id.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1994) (emphasis added); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (stating the Constitutional basis of the originality requirement).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added); For a discussion of the relative flexibility of copyright protection in contrast to patent protection, see Richard H. Stern,
Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105 (1999).
18. Sabra Chartrand, An Internet Entrepreneur Finds a Way for Newsstand Dealers
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method of subscribing to a magazine at a retail outlet.19 Instead of
directly dealing with a magazine publisher by mail to obtain the
lower subscription price, the magazine buyer-subscriber approaches a retail vendor who contacts the publisher electronically
and arranges for the lower subscription price.20 This method enables the buyer immediately to obtain the lower subscription price
on a single-issue purchase at the point of the retail sale and gives
the retail vendor a fee for facilitating the transaction. Each of these
patents pose basic issues of patent law, such as identifying the
prior art and specifying the non-obvious advance entitled to protection.
In this patent, finding the non-obvious, inventive step becomes
troublesome. The patent, as described in the news article, comes
within the State Street Bank rubric if the vendor’s communications
with publishers is accomplished by means of a computer program.21 Suppose, however, it involves a telephone call. Does the
analysis of State Street Bank grant patent protection to a telephone
call, which achieves a useful result? In both circumstances, patents
are thrust into a vibrant, established process of competitive commercial rivalry, a process that has traditionally been governed by
emulation and by customary practices.22 An added perverse result
of this intrusion is the incentive for some entrepreneurs to become
collectors of patent royalties, rather than to continue as active parto Profit from Subscription Sales, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1999, at C8.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. One economist has characterized this process of close emulation of existing
products and services in manufacturing and marketing, as follows:
The general rule for any new manufacturer coming into an industry is to make
your products as like the existing products as you can. . . . It explains why all
automobiles are so much alike. . . . It explains the importance of brand names
in commercial. . . life, for the best way of making a product as much like other
products as possible. . .is to make it physically similar to the others but to call it
something different and to try to build up by advertising a preference in the
mind of the buyer for the name of the product.
KENNETH BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 601 (1941). For a formal development of the
economic theory of this process, entitled product differentiation, see Edward H. Chamberlin, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, ch. 1 (5th ed.) (1946); Willard F.
Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called ‘Product Differentiation,’
18 AMER. U. L. REV. 1 (1968).
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ticipants in the marketplace.23 If the boom in business method patents continues at its accelerating pace, the so-called superhighway
of electronic commerce could be partially converted into a toll
road.
I. SKETCHING AN ECONOMIC MODEL
A historical review of the patent system discloses the dual attributes of the patent that continue to dominate its economic analysis.24 From its early uses, the patent offered both an incentive and
a reward for creative activity, as well as serving as a grant of some
power (monopoly) in the marketplace.25 Although the origin of
patents can be traced to a Fifteenth Century Act of the Venetian
Senate, they attained wide use in England early in the Seventeenth
Century during the reign of James I.26 There, the patent served
frequently as a grant to a favored courtier, rather than as a royal
recognition of creative activity.27 Patents were granted to court
favorites for a wide variety of activities including among others,
the exclusive proprietary rights to manufacture playing cards as
well as the exclusive rights to the running of an alehouse.28
Parliament responded to the perceived abuses of these grants with
the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, which restricted the
23. The newspaper article describing the architectural patent goes on to recite that
the patentees had licensed their patent to developers and were collecting royalties. This
reported fact suggests that these architects no longer derive their total revenue from the
practice of architecture, but are now, in part, functioning as licensors of their patents.
This news article further states: “[The Patentee] said his firm had licensed the patents to
major developers in six states, and had settled out of court with companies he and his
partner have charged with infringing. . .’When we believe someone has infringed on our
patents, we will take due course,’ he said.” Riordan, supra note 10.
The news article on the magazine subscription patent states that the patentee had obtained
a dozen business method patents for such activities, among others, as figuring foreign
exchange insurance premiums, post-paid travelers checks, and a method of playing lotteries. The article further recites that the principal patentee is known best for a patent on
buying airline tickets on the internet. The news story states: “[The patent recites] a ‘reverse auction’ technique that enables consumers to name their own price for airline tickets—which airlines can choose to accept or not.. . .[This patent grants]. . . .exclusive
rights to that particular form of electronic sales.” Chartrand, supra note 18 at C8.
24. Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J.
PATENT OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW & POLICY 153 (2d. ed. 1997).
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ment of the Statute of Monopolies, which restricted the duration of
the privilege, while noting also the injury to competition inherent
in the exercise of patent rights.29 Subsequent economic analysis of
patents continues to address these two attributes of the patent: the
incentive/reward for creative activity and the impediment to competition.30
Patent grants burgeoned in the years following the Industrial
Revolution. By the mid-Twentieth Century the patent as a factor
in industrial expansion had become the subject of study by economists.31 A cursory review of the extensive economic literature on
the theory and function of patents provides a useful introduction to
the present inquiry. This literature, some of which is devoted to
detailed studies of specific patents as practiced in given industries,
provides a reference point from which patent protection for business methods can be assessed. In contemporary economic analysis, patents are characterized as an ancillary factor in the development of technology; it is the application of technology that is
deemed the primary factor in economic growth.32
The middle of the Twentieth Century marks the beginning of
the intensive study of the patent as a factor inducing the research

29. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam. 1, ch.3, § 5 (1623) (Eng.). Sec. 5 provided in
part, that the use of the patent “be not contrary to law, nor mischievous to the State, by
raising the price of commodities. . .or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient. . .” Id. The
abuses leading to the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies have been described as follows: “unscrupulous courtiers persuaded. . .[the Crown] to give them monopolistic rights
even over industries already established. The gravest kinds of abuses immediately
arose. . . . The persons securing the monopoly of salt at once raised the price from 16
pence to 14 shillings.” Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business
Competition, 35 YALE L.J. 905, 930 (1926).
30. Patents, which give the inventor of a new product an exclusive right to sell it,
have both desirable and undesirable effects. The chief benefit is that the possibility of
monopoly profits encourages more inventive activity. The chief disadvantage is that the
new product may be sold at high (monopoly) prices. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY
M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 653 (1990).
31. FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15,
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (1958); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTIONS,
GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, ch. 1
(1969); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and the Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977); FREDRIC M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN
PERSPECTIVES (1984).
32. RICHARD R. NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996).
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and development that produces new technology. Prior to the seminal work of Robert Solow, economists viewed economic expansion
as a function of efficiencies resulting from the proportion of capital
to labor and from the division of the tasks assigned to workers.
Thus, Adam Smith described the rise in the output of pins as a
function of increased mechanization and the division of labor.33
Solow found that technology also makes a material contribution to
increased output.34 In measuring the rise in non-farm output between 1909 and 1949, Solow showed that increased capital intensity alone did not fully account for the measured growth in output.35 Denison, a subsequent investigator, determined that some of
the gain in output per worker for the period 1929-1982 was attributable to capital intensity, increased work force education, and to
the realization of scale economies.36 However, he also noted that a
significant part of the observed increase was attributable to scientific and technological advances.37
Prior to these empirical studies some economists had posed a
related question as a theoretical proposition. These writers, conceding the importance of technology to economic growth, theorized
about the necessary industrial conditions for inducing entrepreneurs to undertake the costs of research and development. Joseph
Schumpeter, a prominent theorist, concluded that a certain amount
of monopoly power in the marketplace, including patent protection, was required to assure society of the benefits of technological
innovation.38 Subsequent empirical studies of various industries

33. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, Book 1, ch. 1 (1776).
34. Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,
39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957).
35. Id.
36. EDWARD F. DENISON, TRENDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 1929-1982 (1985)
37. Id.
38. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106-108
(1942); Schumpeter’s thesis has been summarized as follows:
[T]he competitive process itself consisted of a series of disequilibria, caused by
innovations by dominant firms. Each innovation. . . was undertaken precisely in
the expectation that. . . [the innovation] would yield monopoly profits to the innovating firm. Prospects for monopoly profits induced innovation. . . . This innovation-monopoly-disequilibrium sequence.. . . generated benefits of technical
progress far over-shadowing any niceties of marginal misallocation caused as
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identified the importance of research and development as the strategic factor in nurturing and advancing technology.39 This historical review of specific technological advances showed, for example,
that Watts’ development of the steam engine was attributable to the
prior experimentation by the firm of Boulton & Watt. Similarly, it
was noted that the laboratories of Thomas Edison and Alexander
Graham Bell had contributed materially to the final invention by
the development of models and the testing of various components.40
As to the role of the patent within this process of technological
innovation, economic analysis identifies the patent as an ancillary,
but necessary factor. From this perspective, the patent provides an
incentive for the outlay of the time and the technical skill (the research and development expenses) central to the development of
new technology.41 The incentive feature of the patent followed
from its legal authority to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the patented method or apparatus until the investment (plus
a reasonable rate of return) in research and development had been
recouped through the royalty commanded by the patent.
This basic theoretical model explaining the function of patent
protection is linked to the standard micro-economic assumption
that economic actors are rational in pursuit of maximizing their interests.42 Accordingly, the basic theoretical model addressing the
function of patents states that the patent serves as an incentive to
induce the requisite sunken costs, i.e. the initial outlay of money
and effort in the face of an uncertain outcome.43 Under this as-

market power flickered on and off. . . .
WILLIAM G. SHEPHARD, MARKET POWER & ECONOMIC WELFARE, 16-17 (1970).
39. The pioneering work is SCHERER, supra note 31.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (4th ed. 1992) (the maximizing principle is a fundamental principle of economics).
43. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTIONS, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, ch. 1 (1969); Edmund Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); FRITZ MACHLUP, AN
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY (1958); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and
Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 1 (1991).
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sumption of rational economic behavior, the research and development outlays would not be made, absent some reasonable protection against the immediate copying of a new process or apparatus by a competitor.44 This basic model also posits that the grant of
patent protection and the ability of the patentee to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the patented subject matter provides
the requisite incentive for the outlay of the research and development costs.45 The patent’s exclusionary rights afford the patentee
the power to appropriate the value of the patented subject matter
by commanding a royalty for its use. The prospect of such quasirents, i.e. payments to a factor of production in excess of the
amount required to elicit a supply of that factor, offers an incentive
to engage in the creative conduct leading to the invention.
There is, however, a qualification to this characterization of the
role of patents. Economic analysis, without reference to patents,
posits that competition among market actors is the preferred norm
for efficient allocation of resources.46 Thus, the exclusionary
power of the patent, to which the phrase, “patent monopoly,” is
sometimes attached, is also incorporated into the economic analysis.47 Around this “monopoly” function of the patent economists
have constructed the familiar tradeoff model in which the incentive
effect of this monopoly grant is to be balanced against the deadweight loss attributed to the negative impact of monopoly on consumer welfare.48
In applying this analysis, it is understood that an aggregate approach is taken. This analysis states a general tendency, valid for
economic actors as a group; this approach does not descend to the
level of the incentive needed to induce any given individual to un-

44. Richard C. Levin, et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, 783 (1987).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
46. DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW, ch. 2 (1959); Guido
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211
(1991)(presenting a critical exposition of the theory of optimum efficiency).
47. See CARLTON & PERLOFF supra note 30.
48. Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 175 (1986); F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 400-4 (1970); WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER
AND ECONOMIC WELFARE, 29 (1970).
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dertake research in any one particular product, process, or apparatus or to take account of the risk sensitivity of individual entrepreneurs or investigators. A leading economic scholar of the patent
system has described the incentive function of the patent system,
stating that “the patent system is a crude and imperfect instrument.
Because of diverse real-world complications, the patent protection
given an innovator may be too little, too much, or the wrong
kind.”49
Attempts to address some of the “real world complications”
have brought refinements to the model.50 Edmund Kitch has identified the distinction between the reward function and the prospect
function of patents.51 He stressed the importance of the basic economic incentive model, noting its importance in the pre-invention
environment.52 In addition, he also urged that broad scope be
given to patents, by both the PTO and courts, in order to nurture
post-invention decision-making for the development and exploitation of new processes and devices.53 In his view, a new process or
apparatus would more likely be commercialized by the inventor
who had broad patent protection by insulating such patentee from
competitive rivalry during the early stages of the commercial development of new technology.54 Broadest scope should be afforded “pioneer patents”—those patents which represented important advances and offered the greatest prospect of generating
significant ancillary technology.55 This analysis thus provides a
theoretical economic rationale to support patents as a material incentive to creative activity.56 For this analysis to support the extension of patent protection to methods of doing business would
require some showing of material innovation in business methods—a difficult challenge in light of the rapid emulation of coffee

49. F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 624 (3d. ed. 1990).
50. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977)
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Kitch, supra note 50
56. Id.

RASKINDFMT.DOC

1999]

9/29/2006 3:27 PM

THE STATE STREET BANK DECISION

73

bars, fast food outlets, internet commerce transactions, and web
page communication, among others.
However, before applying this model to patents on business
methods, it is appropriate to take account of the empirical/historical studies of industries in which patents have played a
material role. The empirical work provides a link between the expectations posited by the theory and the observed function of the
patent in industries in which growth is attributable to patented apparatus, processes, and methods. These industry studies provide a
backdrop of experience with both pre-and post-invention environments with which to consider the likely impact on competition of
the widespread patenting of business methods. These historical/empirical studies have the further benefit of directing attention
to the inventive process, as well as to subsequent commercialization of new technology. It is worth noting at this juncture, that the
State Street Bank decision omits any concern with the inventive
step in the business method to which it granted protection. It was
sufficient for the Federal Circuit to find statutory subject matter in
the computer program that had produced “a useful, concrete, and
tangible result.”57
A material contribution of this empirical work is its emphasis
on the nature of the creative process. One such study probed the
source of seventy important inventions asking whether the creative
activity occurred in an industrial laboratory or by individual effort
undertaken on private premises.58 This study showed that only
twenty-four inventions were the product of an industrial laboratory
within a firm.59 More than half of the seventy inventions were the
product of an individual working either in an academic institution
or on her own.60 The substantial empirical/historical literature of
the role played by patents in fostering new technology has recently
been reviewed by Merges and Nelson.61 They focus the empiri-

57. State Street Bank,149 F.3d at 1374 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1994)) (emphasis added).
58. JOHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION, 321 (2d. ed. 1969).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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cal/historical literature on the basic tradeoff question, i.e. whether
greater patent protection increases inventive effort or whether the
net result of broader patent protection is greater deadweight loss.62
These authors assume that it is the scope of protection afforded a
patent that is central to analyzing its impact.63 Their preference for
striking a socially-desirable tradeoff between the desired incentive
role of the patent and the negative deadweight loss engendered by
its monopolistic attributes is to adjust the scope of patent protection.64 Merges and Nelson reviewed the evidence of technological
development in several selected industries from this perspective.65
In testing the theoretical premise that granting broad protection
to the “pioneer” patentee in a cumulative technology industry accelerates technology, these authors examined technological advancement in electric lighting, automobiles, airplanes, radio, and
semiconductors and computers.66 In electric lighting, they found
that Edison’s dominant patent on the carbon filament as a light
source did not result in rapid commercial development.67 They
conclude that “the validation of Edison’s broad patent slowed the
pace of improvements considerably.”68 Moreover, they point out
that the acquisition of Edison’s patent enabled General Electric to
obtain injunctions shutting down competitors, thereby increasing
its market share from 40 to 75 percent.69 General Electric was then
able to limit entry into the industry while making just minimal improvements in the product.70 They contrast the rate of technological improvement in lamps with the more rapid rate of development
in other sectors of the electric industry, such as power generation
and arc-lighting.71 In these sectors they found a causal relation be62. In some circumstances, an increase of deadweight loss may result in higher social welfare as when a patented apparatus becomes a substitute for a most costly input.
See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 250 (1994).
63. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 61, at 840.
64. See id. at 839-40.
65. See id. at 884-905.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 886.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 885.
70. See id. at 885-86.
71. See id. at 887-88.
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tween the absence of broad patent protection and the rapid entry of
competing firms and accelerated product improvement.72
A similar pattern is noted in the automobile and airplane industries which were marked by dominant patents at their inception.73
The Selden patent on the light-weight internal combustion engine
and the Wright patent on the steering and stabilization system of
aircraft contained broadly drawn claims covering a variety of embodiments.74 Merges and Nelson note that the record of the automobile industry shows that Selden did not seek to commercialize
the patent.75 He sought instead to license any user who was willing to acknowledge the patent and to pay royalties.76 The Wrights,
however, refused to license their patent.77 Merges and Nelson note
that these industries did not conform to the theoretical prediction
that the dominant patentee would consider the broad patent protection as an incentive to develop the subject matter.78 The automobile industry developed through others who paid royalties to Selden’s licensing entity.79
Rather than become a
developer/manufacturer, Selden functioned as a collector of royalties.80 The Wrights, however, did undertake to produce airplanes
and to improve their design, but they refused to license others
whose design ideas were at odds with theirs.81 On the basis of
their study of these industries, Merges and Nelson doubt the efficacy of broad patent protection as a means of achieving technological progress.82 As they concluded:
There is good reason to believe that the Wright patent significantly held back the pace of aircraft development in the
United States . . . . The aircraft case is similar to that of

72. See id. at 887.
73. See id. at 888-89.
74. See id. at 888-91.
75. See id. at 888-89; see also, 44 WILLIAM GREENLEAF, MONOPOLY ON WHEELS;
HENRY FORD AND THE SELDEN AUTOMOBILE PATENT (1961).
76. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 61, at 889.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 889-91.
79. See id. at 889-90.
80. See id. at 889.
81. See id. at 890.
82. See id. at 891.
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automobiles in that the problems caused by the initial pioneering patent were compounded as improvements and
complementary patents, owned by different companies,
came into existence. The situation was so serious that at
the insistence of the Secretary of the Navy, during World
War I, an arrangement was worked out to enable automobile cross licensing. This arrangement. . .turned out to be a
durable institution. By the end of World War I there were
so many patents on different aircraft features that a company had to negotiate a large number of licenses to produce
a state-of-the-art plane.83
In contrast, these authors cite the radio industry as an example
of the potential for gridlock in the development of a technology
when several broad patents exist on complementary components.84
The conflict and diverting litigation was ultimately resolved by the
formation of a single entity, the Radio Corporation of America
(RCA), which took in the owners of all of the potentially blocking
patents as major shareholders in the corporation.85 Comparing the
development of technology in autos and airplanes with the experience of the radio industry, they conclude that “many early inventors in cumulative technologies often perform overlapping research. This may lead to blockages unless basic patents are not
present, or routine licensing and cross licensing is instituted.”86
The semiconductor and computer industry is then cited as an
example of an industry in which technology advancement was accelerated by the absence of broad patents on its pioneering technology.87 The history of this industry shows that the initial transistor patent was held by AT&T, which was barred by an antitrust
decree from enforcing it.88 Moreover, the two patents on parts of
the integrated circuit held by Fairchild and by Texas Instruments
were quickly cross-licensed under the aegis of the Department of

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 890-1.
See id.
See id. at 893
Id.
See id. at 893-94.
See id. at 894.
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Defense, the principle purchaser of this technology at the time.89
In the semiconductor and related electronic industries, Merges and
Nelson concluded that “patents have played only a very minor role
in the computer industry, and where patents are concerned, cross
licensing is common.”90
Based on their review of these and other industries (chemical
and biotechnology), the authors state their conclusion as to the effects of broad patent protection as follows:
Our general conclusion is that multiple and competitive
sources of invention are socially preferable to a structure
where there is only one or a few sources. Public policy, including patent law, ought to encourage inventive rivalry,
and not hinder it . . . . [A] rivalrous structure surely has its
inefficiencies. But such a structure does tend to generate
rapid technological progress and seems a better social bet
than a regime where only one or a few organizations control the development of a given technology.91
II. APPLYING THE MODEL
The theoretical model adjusted by empirical data illuminates
the basic policy choices presented by the patent regime. Since the
theoretical trade-off model frames both the incentive function as
well as the monopoly element of patents, the first step in assessing
the policy justification for adding subject matter to section 101 of
the Patent Act92 is to pose the question: is an incentive required to
induce this kind of activity—i.e. new methods of doing business?
This inquiry is linked to a collateral question because the exclusionary rights of section 154(a)(1) enable the patentee to prevent
immediate access to the protected subject matter by a competitor—
the monopoly element.93 As an incentive, patents grant innovators
89. See id. Anecdotal information is that Texas Instruments made its patents a profit
center. Some estimates suggest that but for its patent royalties, the company would have
operated at a loss for several years. This practice may have achieved an economically
efficient outcome in that low-cost manufacturers practiced the patents.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 908.
92. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
93. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).
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quasi-rents to appropriate the value of their inventions, as well as
the protection against immediate commercialization of a similar
process or apparatus by competitors, who may have incurred little
or no research costs. Accordingly, the collateral incentive question
is: are there presently cited instances of aggressive rivalrous practices that are undercutting the incentive to further innovation of
methods of doing business? At this writing, there is no pending
legislation seeking protection against such practices.94 Are there,
however, grounds other than abusive practices or “free-riding” for
granting patent protection to business methods?
Again, empirical data on the function of business method patents is insubstantial, because of the brief period in which business
methods have enjoyed patent protection. There is an additional
limitation in applying these empirical studies to business method
patents. The patents in the industries described above have been
associated with the production side of economic activity. Innovation in products and processes there involved tangible assets moving in market transactions. The dollar value of these products can
be identified and measured.95 The business practices which received protection in the State Street Bank decision involve the service and distribution side of economic activity.96 Significantly,
there seem to be no studies of distribution and service industries as
an element in economic growth beyond the calculation of their
contribution in the national income accounts.97 In the absence of
data showing a need to spur innovation in business methods, it is
equally plausible that the spur of competition and the long tradition
of competition by emulation have been sufficient to provide an
adequate level of innovation in methods of doing business.98
94. Perceived abusive competitive practices frequently are reflected in legislation.
The House of Representatives for the last three sessions has responded to requests for
database protection. See H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. § 273 (1999). Similarly, Congress has
enacted design protection for vessel hulls to reverse the denial by the Supreme Court of
state law protection of such designs in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141 (1989). See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, P.L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1332) (1998).
95. See J. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 660-66 (1993)
96. See 149 F.3d at 1370-72.
97. See STIGLITZ, supra note 95 (noting the contribution of service providers to employee compensation, profits, rents, interest, and taxes).
98. See id.
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There is further reason to avoid reliance on economic theory as
a basis for the expansive grant of patents on methods of doing
business. Recent economic writing, as well as the literature of law
and economics invites caution.99 Innovation predicted as rational
economic behavior as a matter of abstract theory may not occur.
Economic opportunities posited by theory may not always be embraced because other strategies may dominate.100 In such instances
technology may be impeded rather than accelerated.101 The basic
premise of economic rationality itself, is currently under review
among economists and law and economics scholars. An emerging
field of “behavioral economics” calls into question the universal
validity of the traditional maximizing assumption by drawing on
insights from studies in cognitive psychology.102 Such studies
draw on the basic maximizing assumption, but modify it by the insights and experiments of psychologists. What emerges from this
work is the conception of economic actors making choices from
preferences shaped by past experience as well as by differential
risk and loss assessments. For example, consumers’ conception of
the “unfairness” of a price may require a profit-maximizing monopolist to price below the optimum price predicted by traditional

99. See Thomas G. Krattenmacher & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986)(describing
strategic behavior); William J. Baumol & Janusz Ordover, Uses of Antitrust To Subvert
Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985).
100. See Krattenmacher, supra note 99.
101. Id.
102. Albert O. Hirschman, Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a
Quasi-Vanishing Act, 13 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE, 385 (1965)(attitudes toward
development do not conform to maximizing assumption); George A. Akerlof & William
T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV.
307 (1982)(identifying transactions in which economic actors respond differentially to the
same data based on cognitive differences); Shira Lewin, Economics and Psychology:
Lessons for Our Own Day from the Early Twentieth Century, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1293
(1996)(recounting the historical tension between mainstream economists’ reliance on rational choice and attempts to infuse economic theory with behavioral perspectives); see
also, TERENCE W. HUTCHISON, THE SIGNIFICANCE AND BASIC POSTULATES OF ECONOMIC
THEORY, 41 (1938)(urging logical positivism as the approach to behavioral assumptions
in economics); Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach To Consumer Theory, 74 J. POL.
ECON. 132 (1966). But see, Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory,
70 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962)(defending traditional analysis).
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theory.103 Overall, this literature describes human decision-making
as being prone to non-rational, yet systematic tendencies.104
Although behavioral economics is still in its developmental
stage, there is sufficient credible work to suggest that behavior
other than universal maximizing can be incorporated into economic models. The significance of behavioral economics for present purposes is that it casts doubt on the conclusion that broad patent protection for new subject matter can be justified solely on the
micro-economic model that such protection is required to induce
innovation. Limited reliance by judges and other decision-makers
on unqualified postulates of rational economic behavior is also
suggested by the recent work of a group of economic theorists
whose research suggests empirical testing of theoretical postulates.
A leading economic theorist has described that “theory is being
forced to be much more specific. The whole intention of empirical
economics is to force theory down to earth.”105
These developments in economic analysis suggest that absent
supporting empirical data, the need for patent protection of business methods should be considered an unsettled question because
the State Street Bank opinion does not provide an analytical platform for business method patents. Rather, the opinion rests on the
proposition that the Patent Act authorizes patents, including busi-

103. Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986).
104. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in THE
RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 203 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Colombatto, Mark Perlman & Christian Schmidt eds., 1996); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach To Law And Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998); but see, Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics,
And The Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness
Into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1292 (1993); Matthew
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11 (1998). See also, Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999).
105. George A. Akerlof, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at C1. The same article cites
empirical testing of the theoretical premise that a rise in the minimum wage will cause a
decline in the demand for minimum wage workers. A comparative survey of the fast-food
markets in New Jersey and Pennsylvania showed that an increase in the minimum wage
in New Jersey had no effect on the number of minimum wage workers employed. Id. at
C10.
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ness method patents.106 The opinion does not address the issue of
implementing this perspective on a case by case application of the
Patent Act. The mischief of this decision is its failure to recognize
any difference between laboratory and experimentally-generated
methods and processes and methods derived from the competitive
rivalry of the marketplace, an arena dominated by emulation and
narrowed to conformity by regulatory statutes and regulations. Accordingly, the precedential value of this decision should be assessed as neither barring nor necessarily advancing business
method patents. Such a restrictive interpretation is supported by the
opinion itself. Setting aside the improvident strictures against the
prior rule, Judge Rich wrote that, “Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same
legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process
or method.”107
Accordingly, the burden of establishing patent protection for a
business method should remain on the claimant to present credible
supporting data to establish eligibility for patent protection. A distinct element of a claimant’s burden for the grant of a business
method should be the identification of the inventive contribution.
Identification of the prior art is also required. Arguments for patent
protection grounded on theoretical models as needed incentives to
innovation should be dismissed. Granting relief based solely on a
traditional economic model has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court in a non-patent case.108 The same approach should be
taken by the PTO examiners and by judges in considering claims
of patent protection for methods of doing business. Recent analysis
of the decision to patent, as well as the decision to risk infringement, portray a world far more complex than that of the traditional
maximizing model.109 Courts should give weight to the fact that
business methods are not derived from laboratory research and experimentation, but evolve and are implemented in an environment
of rivalry and emulation. The interactive responses that shape

106. See id.
107. 149 F.3d at 1375.
108. Id. (rejecting Kodak’s argument for a presumption of legality based on a theoretical model and requiring a presentation of market data).
109. See infra notes 113-114.
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business methods are largely shaped by customary practices. Business methods are devised as much by current fads in customer appeal as by experimentation and innovation, e.g. the welter of goods
and services tumbling daily from the Internet.
There is also a constraining element in the emulation of business methods. Product groups and services tend to cluster in a
sameness of near-similarity to their potential customers. A
seller/producer who moves in advance of the revealed preferences
of consumers’ risks a loss of customers and a resulting decline in
revenue. Intruding patent protection into such an emulating, competitive market system, absent a clear showing of useful innovative
advances, serves only to disrupt. In such circumstances, patent protection offers entrepreneurs the alternative of entirely or partially
withdrawing from participation as market actors in favor of devoting their energies to licensing and litigating patent infringement
cases. The consequence of such conduct may be to increase transactions costs, which may, because of the monopoly element of patents, result in price increases and a negative impact on consumer
welfare.
Litigation costs are a significant factor in patent protection.110
Studies have identified litigation costs as a material element in the
management of patent rights.111 For example, if preliminary injunctions are readily available in infringement cases involving
business method patents, an incentive is provided for recourse to
litigation, sometimes at modest cost, as a means to impede a competitor.112 Accordingly, courts should be restrictive in granting
preliminary injunctions in business method patent cases.113 Mod-

110. Josh Lerner, Patenting In The Shadow Of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463
(1995).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. One study shows that the Federal Circuit has increased the grant of preliminary
injunctions since its inception, William A. Morrison, Note, The Impact of the Creation of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the Availability of Preliminary Injunctive
Relief Against Patent Infringement, 23 IND. L. REV. 169 (1990); see e.g., Systemation, Inc.
v. Engel Indus. Inc., 1999 WL 129640 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 1999) (unpublished table decision); PPG Industries v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351 (Fed Cir. 1998). See also,
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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est use of injunctive relief has the further advantage of preserving
the incentive feature of the patent, without concurrently maintaining or enhancing its “monopoly” potential.114
Restraint in the issuance of business method patents is also
warranted on the part of the Patent Office. Initially, the grant of
business method patents by the PTO should be founded on a strict
application of the Patent Act itself. Although the opinion in State
Street Bank stresses the single issue of rejecting a business method
exception in secrion 101,115 the Patent Act requires more.116 Now
that the business method exemption has been effectively removed
from patent jurisprudence, decision-makers face the basic framework of the Act, without much guidance from the opinion in State
Street Bank. Evolving a workable patent regime for the protection
for business methods is a substantially larger undertaking than this
opinion implies.
Consider the ready availability of preliminary injunctions as
well as the application of the State Street Bank opinion in the following hypothetical situations. Recall that Dell Computer avoids
retail distribution costs by delivering to the consumer directordered, custom-built computers. To fill the consumer’s order Dell
uses a variation of Henry Ford’s assembly line method of manufacture. Instead of a moving assembly line, Dell’s employees form a
cell of two or three workers who assemble the entire final product
to the consumer’s specifications in a fixed factory location. Gateway, a competing seller of computers, observing the success of
Dell’s direct-order method and its resulting lower selling prices,
seeks a market niche by emulating Dell’s direct-sale, customized
manufacturing. Suppose then that Gateway adds a chain of retail
facilities where consumers may browse, inspect, and try many different computers prior to placing a direct order for the one selected. Now Circuit City, a large, national electronics-retailing
competitor, comes into the same relevant market. Circuit City
management, responding to a loss of computer sales to its competi114. Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999).
115. 149 F.3d at 1375.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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tors, modifies its traditional showroom, point of sale retail method.
Circuit City managers emulate the sales methods of their competitors with the following modification. In addition to offering on-site
inspection and expert salesperson assistance in demonstrating the
use of many brands of computers, Circuit City adopts Gateway’s
direct-order method by adding a kiosk on its premises from which
a direct order can be placed to either Dell or to Gateway from its
toll-free telephone line. Circuit City then works out a “finder’s fee”
schedule with Dell and Gateway whereby Circuit City obtains a
stated percentage of the value of each order placed from its premises.
Assume Dell, Gateway, and Circuit City all seek to patent their
distribution method. What is the prior art—Henry Ford’s assembly
line, Sears Roebuck’s early mail order catalog, L.L. Bean’s successor catalog, Victoria’s Secret’s Web Page, or Amazon.com’s Internet book distribution? This is an essential inquiry, one which was
not addressed in the State Street Bank opinion, although the opinion recited that “business methods have been and should have been
subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied
to any other process or method.”117 The search for prior art becomes complex when it is noted that business methods predated
the origin of the patent regime and the United States Constitutional
basis for them.118 Is the bill of exchange of the Law Merchant a
precursor of the contemporary financial instrument known as a derivative? Moreover, the economic model sketched above underscored the need to assess the efficacy of patents by a study of the
role of patents in development of specific industries.119 Given the
absence of protection for business methods prior to the State Street
117. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 33 (1966), the court noted the centrality of the prior art inquiry. The prior art of business methods has a long historical trail. Business transactions predate the founding of the
patent regime. The first barter transaction involved a method of doing business. Many
business methods are ingrained in social customs. Banking is an example in which custom, manifold government regulations, and the spur of competition have produced stylized transactions. Finding the prior art in the practice of credit transactions would pose
daunting definitional and investigative task.
118. THEODORE F.P. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, ch. 5
(5th ed. 1956) (tracing the development of maritime and mercantile law from customary
practices).
119. See id.
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Bank decision, there presently exist no industry studies of them.
Indeed, to plan an industry study of current patent protection of
business methods poses issues of circularity. To assess the causal
link between patent protection and the growth of a business practice, it would be necessary to distinguish between the impetus
given the practice by the spur of competition and that attributable
to patent protection. For example, is the development of financial
instruments suited to inclusion in a Roth IRA attributable to the
competition inspired by this tax-saving feature of the Internal
Revenue Code, or to the creativity of financial intermediaries, or
partially to each?
Suppose Dell sues Circuit City for infringement of its business
method patent and the defendant relied on section 273 of H.R.
1907, recently passed by the House.120 This provision authorizes a
defense of use based on an earlier invention.121 Section 273 (a)(3)
provides that the phrase “use of a method in the United States,” includes a “method of doing or conducting business.”122 How would
a court rule and make findings based on a definition of Dell’s
method of conducting business?123
Also absent from the State Street Bank opinion is guidance in
identifying the non-obvious advance over the prior art—the invention. Assume that Dell, Gateway, and Circuit City each employ a
different software designer to execute their business method. Assuming that there are material differences in the design of each
software program does each computer program of each competitor
warrant patent protection? Suppose each program was independently created and each program manages the costs of inventory,
manufacturing, and distribution, as well as computing a final retail
price. If so, what is the scope of each patent? Business methods in
substantial part are a product of market interaction among competi120. H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. § 273 (1999).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Recently, Congress has underscored the importance of determining the invention in business patent methods. On August 4, 1999, the House of Representatives
passed H.R. 1907, The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, in which § 273(a)(3)
defines “method” for purposes of the defense to infringement based on earlier invention,
to include “a method of doing or conducting business.” 58 (BNA) PAT., TRADEMARK, &
COPYRIGHT J. 413 (Aug. 5, 1999).
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tors. As the above example illustrates, commercial rivalry itself is a
material factor in changing business methods. Which patent doctrine can serve to draw the line between those changes in business
methods attributable to a competitor and those that are sufficiently
innovative and non-obvious to warrant patent protection under
State Street Bank? Because business methods have their origin in
the first barter transaction in antiquity and have evolved by custom, to grant them protection now within the framework of the
Patent Act is troublesome. To do so requires distinguishing between methods derived from customary practice from those sufficiently novel and original to warrant patent protection. In the current computer-dominated market environment it may even be
difficult properly to identify the innovation. The State Street Bank
case is illustrative of the nature of this task.124
On the fundamental issue of identifying the invention, the opinion offers no guidance. Indeed it is difficult to distill the innovation from the facts as recited in the State Street Bank opinion.125
Boes, the inventor, was a software designer engaged to write a
program executing the calculations required by the Regulations to
the Internal Revenue Code.126 Those Regulations set out in great
detail the basic transactional and conceptual structure for Boes’
software program.127 Necessarily, his program follows this structure. The regulations provide the conceptual principles and give
examples of partnership transactions having “substantial economic
effect”128—the touchstone of allowable allocation of income items,
gains, losses, deductions, and credits to partner’s capital accounts.129 It might appear from the length and the complexity of
these regulations that they represent original and innovative exposition of a difficult concept in the federal income taxation of part-

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
Id. at 1370-2.
Id. at 1370.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(1997).
Id.
WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS § 10.02 (1997); Lawrence Lokken, Partnership Allocations, 41 TAX L. REV.
545 (1986); Michael J. Close & Dan A. Kusnetz, The Final Section 704(b) Regulations:
Special Allocations Reach New Heights of Complexity, 40 TAX LAW. 307 (1987).
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nerships.130 However, on closer scrutiny it becomes apparent that
this appearance is illusory.
The issuance of regulations is a collaborative process of response and review.131 Congress enacts tax legislation phrased in
broad, general terms.132 The task of making many statutory provisions meaningful to specific transactions is often assigned to the
regulations.133 These, in turn, are developed by a process of notice, the issuance of Temporary Regulations through consultation
with the tax bar and other interested persons.134
When
subsequently issued as Final Regulations, particularly those
involving partnerships, the Regulations generally reflect the
resolution of tensions between the taxpayers and the Service over
transactions which in form are permitted by some provisions of the
Code, but in substance result in tax-avoidance.135 For example,
suppose a taxpayer’s partnership agreement provides that all of the
depreciation allowance on a partnership asset is allocated to
Partner A, an arrangement permitted by one provision of the
Internal Revenue Code and the Uniform Partnership Act.136
Without more, the Code provision governing depreciation would
permit this arrangement for Partner A, even if she owned a .01
percent interest in the partnership asset, Blackacre.137 She bears
.01 risk in Blackacre and would claim all of a deduction associated
with that asset.138 The Regulations reverse this outcome on an
analysis of substance over form.139

130. See Close, supra note 129.
131. In I.R.C. § 7805 (1995), Congress has delegated the authority to promulgate
Regulations to the Secretary of the Treasury. Such Regulations are issued initially as
temporary regulations and are subjected to a process of public comment prior to being
issued in final form, I.R.C. § 7805(e)(1). Generally, courts give great weight to these
Regulations. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967)(finding limited scope of
judicial review of Treasury Regulations); JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 25-26 (1997).
132. See FREELAND, supra note 131 at 25-6.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Close supra note 129.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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In these circumstances, it is difficult to identify innovation in a
text largely descriptive of transactions structured by taxpayers and
reviewed and re-characterized in the Regulations drafted by I.R.S.
employees. Not infrequently, a phrase or an example will be the
result of several rounds of negotiation.140 A fragment of tax law
underscores this point.141 Partnership taxation is more complex
than the taxation of individuals, trusts and estates, or corporations,
because the Internal Revenue Code makes a dual characterization
of the partnership.142 The partnership as such is not subject to income tax liability because the partnership is not defined by the
Code as a taxable entity.143 Instead it is treated as an aggregation
of partners, who are the ultimate taxpayers.144 However the Internal Revenue Code also views the partnership as an entity to the extent that it serves as the computation unit to determine the character and the amount of partnership income attributable to each
taxpayer-partner.145 Complexity is added to the calculation of each
partner’s distributive share of the partnership’s incomedetermining items by the provision that permits the partnership
agreement to control the allocation of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit to the partners.146 A text on partnership taxation describes the required calculations as follows: “[T]he partnership . . .[is required] to keep two sets of accounts—one for “tax”
purposes and the other for “book” purposes. The “book” items reflect the economic arrangement of the partners. The “tax”
items. . .must be determined with reference to the partners’ distributive shares of the corresponding book items”.147

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. I.R.C. § 701 (“A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter.”).
144. Id.
145. I.R.C. § 702(b) (“The character of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit. . .shall be determined as if. . .[it] were realized directly from the source. . .realized
by the partnership.”).
146. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (“A partner’s distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit. . .shall be determined in accordance with the partner’s interest in the
partnership (determined by taking into account all facts and circumstances). . . .”).
147. S.A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, 174 (3d. ed.
1992).

RASKINDFMT.DOC

1999]

9/29/2006 3:27 PM

THE STATE STREET BANK DECISION

89

This tax text also notes the limited guidance offered to taxpayers by the Internal Revenue Code in making these complex calculations, noting that “[t]he Code itself provides no guidance, the allocation question has historically been answered in regulations and
rulings issued by the Treasury.”148
In contrast to the Code, the regulations do indeed supply guidance.149 Comprising fifty-three pages in the Code of Federal Regulations this comprehensive text, coupled with copious examples,
sets out in elaborate detail the items to be adjusted and the method
of their adjustment.150 A comparison between these regulations
and the claims of the Signature patent reveals a parallel structure.151 This comparison shows that the patent claims closely approximate the form and substance of the regulations.152 In these
circumstances, the analysis of the State Street Bank opinion does
not illuminate the innovative contribution.153 The opinion addressed this issue only in terms of the result, as follows:
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series
of mathematical calculations . . . constitute a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces a useful, concrete and tangible result —a final share price momentarily fixed for recording
and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon
148. See DEWEY, supra note 46, at 186.
149. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.704-1 (1997) (covering the determination of tax liability for
partners’ distributive share).
150. Id.
151. See I.R.C. § 706(d)(2)(A) (requiring a daily computation of any change in
each partner’s interest in the partnership as of the close of each day) & Treas. Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(requiring the allocation of income, gain, loss, or deduction in the daily
calculation of each partner’s capital account). See also, Richard H. Stern, Scope of Protection Problems With Patent and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 105 (1999). In his Appendix A, Stern notes the parallel format between the requirements set out in the Treasury Regulations and the claims
of the Signature Financial patent. This parallelism suggests little, if any, originality on the
part of the patentee. Moreover, were this patent to cover the most efficient method of
compliance with these complex calculations, a taxpayer could be required to obtain a license in order to comply with the Internal Revenue Codes mandate timely to file an accurate Form 1040.
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.704 (text and examples).
153. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
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by regulatory authorities . . . .154
The opinion thus finds a useful, concrete and tangible result
without identifying the invention which produced it.155 The contribution of Boes, the software programmer, was not explored in the
opinion.156 The absence in the opinion of any reference to the
originality of the program written by Boes leaves one to wonder
whether, as a software program, it was novel and innovative or
trivial. The opinion obscures the basic patent inquiry of finding
non-obviousness in either the program qua software program or in
the method of deriving the information required by the regulations.157 The opinion does not apply the Patent Act’s requirement
of identifying the novel, non-obvious advance over the prior art.158
The invention remains unstated. Moreover, it is difficult to distill
it from the opinion. The conception and structure of Boes’ program
was dictated by its function of accomplishing compliance with the
Income Tax Regulations.159 Boes’ program closely follows the
regulations. Accordingly, the question remains whether this case

154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. The comparison of the patent claims with the Regulations could support the
conclusion that neither the drafters of the Regulations nor the software programmer had
contributed much that would be considered novel or original. First issued in 1960, these
Regulations have subsequently been revised eleven times. In their present form, these
Regulations reflect the accretion of governmental responses to taxpayers statements and
objections. Overall, the objective of the government has been to identify those partnership transactions that reduce tax liability as formal arrangements lacking economic substance. One tax authority has described the interactive nature of the process of writing
regulations as follows:
The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated the authority to issue regulations to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, subject to the approval of the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. Typically, a regulation is published in
the Federal Register as a notice of Proposed rulemaking. Comments from the
public are received, and often a public hearing is held, before final regulations
are published. . .
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 73 (2d ed. 1988). See also, Northern
Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 296
(1990) (invalidating a method patent for failure to disclose best mode.) Failure to disclose
all the details may cause a court to conclude that the claims fail the non-obvious requirement.
156. See State Street Bank, 149 F.3d 1368, and supra text accompanying note 155.
157. Id.
158.. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d 1368.
159. See Stern, supra note 151 at Appendix A.
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offers a sufficient platform for the announcement of a broad, new
rule.160 Equally troublesome is the hint in the opinion that a
method of compliance with regulatory authorities can serve as an
element of support for patent protection.161 Assume that a second
programmer writes a new program to execute the same function,
knowing only that another program exists for these calculations.
Assume further that the second program, made freely available to
the public, contained only minor variations in the Boes method of
calculations because both programs are bound by the structure of
the regulations.162 If broad scope is given to the Boes patent,
might a taxpayer’s use of a freely available, efficient method of
complying with a government regulation pose the risk of liability
for patent infringement?
A further source of unease over this opinion is its potential for
generating a boom in business method patents.163 The broad language of this opinion would support the patenting of the sales
methods of Dell, Gateway, and Circuit City in the above examples.
If the distribution method of each were reduced to a software program described as a means of calculating a maximizing strategy for
increasing sales revenue and minimizing overhead costs, these
programs could meet the test of the opinion. Moreover, this decision obligates the patent bar to advise enterprise managers of the
availability of this new protection for their business methods. This
protection extends to fields other than financial services.164 Banking, insurance, and accounting are most likely to be immediately
involved in seeking such patent protection. However, protection is
unlikely to be limited to these sectors because the patent bar has an
obligation to advise their clients of the availability of patent protection of their methods of doing business. So the impact of the State
Street Bank decision serves as the proverbial pebble in a pond
causing a series of widening concentric circles of business method
patents. Seminars by patent practitioners could generate awareness
among business managers not only of the prospect of protection for

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.; see also, supra text accompanying note 155.
State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1368.
Id.
See “Boom”, supra note 7.
See supra note 22 and text accompanying notes 13-20.
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their business methods, but also of the potential revenue from licensing them. Patents granted could become patents enforced or
licensed. Litigation expenses and royalty payments become new
transaction costs of doing business and such costs may in some
market circumstances, negatively impact consumer welfare.
Where is the societal benefit from this extension of patent protection to business methods? Assume that in this example, Dell,
Gateway, and Circuit City all are granted patents, with Dell being
the first to file. What claims might Dell raise against the others? If
Dell’s patent is given broad scope on the authority of State Street
Bank, are consumers better served? If, in these circumstances, all
patentees meet and come to a cross licensing, pooling arrangement,
are consumers more likely to be benefited? If so, do patents on
business methods have the potential of inducing cartel arrangements among competitors? Are some consumers likely to bear the
increased transaction costs from the resulting fees and charges?
These are questions to consider as the process of patenting business methods goes forward.
What guidance can be derived from the fragment of economic
analysis presented here? Overall, from the perspective of the
model developed earlier, the broad grant of patent protection for
methods of doing business is something of a square peg in a sinkhole of uncertain dimensions. Nowhere in the substantial literature
on innovation is there a statement that the United States economy
suffers from a lack of innovation in methods of doing business.
Compared with the business practices of comparable economies
we seem to be innovators in distribution and in the service industries. By the casual empiricism of counting the number of graduate
business schools, the United States is ahead of other developed
economies. This datum, plus the substantial enrollment of foreign
students in the graduate schools of business in the United States,
permits the inference that business methods in this country as presently practiced, are considered innovative and attractive, despite
the prior absence of patent protection.165
There is, moreover, substantial anecdotal evidence that competition alone serves as a sufficient spur to innovation in business
165. See Riordan, supra notes 14 and 23.
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methods. The rapid cluster of development in the following businesses casts doubt on the need for the added incentive of patents.
Consider the growth of fast food restaurants, self-service gasoline
stations, quick oil change facilities, supermarkets for food and office supplies, automatic teller devices and other banking services,
electronic fund transfers, supplemental insurance for physician
services, and alternatives for long-distance telephone services. To
the argument that the economy of the United States would function
even better with such patent protection, the model casts doubt. The
case for broad patent protection, plausible as a matter of theory,
has been qualified by the historical/empirical studies of industries
in which there had been broad patent protection.166
Moreover, conceding the possibility of free-riding as well as
outright piracy of business methods, the absence of patent protection would not leave a total void of legal remedies. There are a variety of federal and state alternative regimes of protection.167
Copyright, misappropriation, unfair competition, and deceptive
practices statutes may serve as alternative means of protection.168
These regimes may serve to furnish the incentive of protection as
well as a means of redress against “dirty tricks” by competitors.169
For example, the software program in which the Boes invention
was embedded could have been protected by copyright, although if
tested in litigation, the scope of copyright protection would likely
have been limited to the literal code in Boes’ program.170

166. See supra note 38. Leading economic scholars of industrial organization have
expressed their preference for the balance between patent protection and the competitive
norm, as follows:
What is needed for rapid technical progress is a subtle blend of competition and
monopoly, with more emphasis in general on the former than the latter, and
with the role of monopolistic elements diminishing when rich technological
opportunities exist.
FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 660 (3d. ed. 1990).
167. Id.
168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
169. Id.
170. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-8
(3d Cir. 1983); Computer Associates, Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding literal elements of computer programs, such as source and object code
protectible).
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Indeed, a comparison of copyright protection with patent protection reveals some potential for over-inclusive protection under
the patent regime. Copyright has both statutory and case law limiting doctrines.171 Thus, the copyright cases afford minimal protection for works of low creativity such as directories and other factual compilations.172 The Copyright Act itself bars protection for
“any idea, procedure, process, system. . .concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”173 Commonplace standard forms of expression,
ideas, elements dictated by efficiency considerations, and elements
taken from the public domain are also filtered from copyright
protection.174 Courts in deciding copyright cases have balanced
the need for copyright protection with a regard for the competitive
process.175 By comparison with the nuanced treatment afforded by
the copyright regime, the Patent Act as interpreted by Judge Rich
in State Street Bank, is a grant of broad scope, which may or may
not be cabined in subsequent cases by general patent principles.176

171. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1994).
172. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (compiling
a white page telephone book in alphabetical format fails the Constitutional requirement of
originality). See Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963) (noting a thin protection for fact intensive works); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection
for Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990); No “Sweat?” Copyright and
Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 338 (1992) (exploring alternative regimes for the protection of data bases and other
fact works).
173. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1994), codifying Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
(copyright law protects only expression; the accounting system expressed is directed to
the patent regime in dictum).
174. See Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 710 (limiting the scope of copyright protection to exclude reduced by a filtering process removing items common to industry
practice).
175. See Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding copying to be fair use where the grant of protection would have dampened competition); Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir.
1977) (granting protection to bar “chiseling for personal profit.”)
176. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (citing with approval State Street Bank statement that calculations integral to a
machine or process are subject matter if applied in a useful manner). In H.R. 1907,
passed by the House on August 4, 1999, Congress seemingly undertook, albeit indirectly,
to underscore that business method patents are like all other method patents with regard
to the determination of the date of invention. This reference is not likely to serve as a limiting doctrine for business method patents. H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. § 273 (1999).
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In addition to copyright protection, there is protection under the
misappropriation rationale.177 In 1918, the Supreme Court struck
down an unfair method of doing business by announcing the amorphous doctrine of a quasi-property interest in uncopyrighted news,
dubbing such a taking a misappropriation.178 Although the federal
misappropriation doctrine has been subjected to substantial criticism, courts and legislatures have relied upon it.179 In the current
session of Congress, H.R. 354 has been introduced to protect data
base collections on a misappropriation theory.180 In addition to the
misappropriation doctrine announced in the INS case, there is a
body of federal and state statutory restrictions on unfair competition.181 Limited federal protection of business methods may be
available under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for the established
trade designation of business methods.182

177. See Jones, supra note 29.
178. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)( INS
took advantage of the time differential between New York and California to copy a competitor’s news stories in New York and to telegraph them in time for publication as its
own in California).
179. Dennis Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm,
94 COLUM L. REV. 2594 (1994); Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property
and the Legacy of International News Service, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983); Leo J.
Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrines as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property
Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991); See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)
(reporter who acted on confidential information gathered for news stories for personal
gain in the securities markets held to have defrauded newspaper employer by misappropriating property of the newspaper).
180. H.R. 354, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999), proposing to add a new chapter 14 to
Title 17, “Misappropriation of Collections of Information.” See 57 (BNA) PATENT,
COPYRIGHT, AND TRADEMARK J. 226, 233 (1999).
181. See Doliner v. Brown, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 692 (1986)(holding the use of public
information to competitive advantage not actionable); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 1 (1990) (makes actionable the appropriation of trade values, among
other competitive harms).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1998) (barring the use of any “term, name, symbol, or device” which is likely to cause confusion as to the “commercial activities by another person.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983);
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v, Blue Cross of Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 58 (1990) (permitting a Lanham Act claim against derogatory characterization
of a competitor’s method of health care delivery).
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III. ANTITRUST DOCTRINES OF PATENT MISUSE AS A LIMITATION
Given the weakness of the case for patent protection of business methods, the quest for means of limiting the scope of the State
Street Bank opinion may turn to the doctrine of patent misuse. This
equitable doctrine, developed by judges in antitrust cases, evolved
as a set of independent principles in the late Nineteenth Century.183
Because patent misuse was developed in cases involving transactions of assignment, of licensing, or of the sale of products embodying patented technology, the doctrine remains bounded by its
transactional origins. As this doctrine functions, a patent transaction can be brought under patent misuse scrutiny by an antitrust enforcement agency as a violation of the antitrust laws, or an antitrust
violation may be raised by a vendee/licensee/assignee as a defense
to a suit for infringement. When patent misuse is invoked, courts
are faced with the task of resolving the tension between the monopoly attributes of a patent and the antitrust law’s policy of competition as the preferred norm in markets. The doctrine of patent
misuse evolved as judges began to impose limits on the scope of
patent rights and to accord priority to the policy of competition by
invoking the Sherman Act.184
Accordingly, it might appear that the danger of an overly expansive application of business method patents would be checked
by the doctrine of patent misuse, however, this restraint is unlikely
to materialize. A survey of the principal categories of patent misuse shows that this doctrine is steeped in its transactional origins
involving patents for tangible products and processes. Thus, there
are no branches of the patent misuse doctrine that are immediately
183. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873) (holding patentee’s geographic use restriction held unenforceable);Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d. 661
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding patentee’s tying arrangement unenforceable). See generally
Donald F. Turner, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L. J. 267 (1966); Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73 (1982);
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813
(1984).
184. Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1994); see also Norman E. Rosen,
Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Pendulum: Recent Developments at the Interface
between the Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1994) (reviewing antitrust developments relating to intellectual property rights).
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applicable to patents on business methods which involve neither
physical assets and processes nor transactions of sale, license, or
assignment. Sales of products embodying patented technology,
however, could invoke the traditional misuse doctrines if such
sales or licenses are coupled with conditions such as a stated resale
price, a promise not to develop competing technology, or a requirement also to buy an unpatented item.185 Thus, to extend patent misuse principles to business method patents would require judicial extension beyond existing misuse analysis.
Even if there were the judicial inclination to extend the patent
misuse analysis to business method patents, some doctrinal modification would be required, since business patents are distinctive in
their direct application to the conduct and practices of market actors. In contrast, the patents around which the patent misuse doctrine was developed generally involved the use of the patent to
condition subsequent conduct of others such as an assignee, a
vendee, or a licensee. While current patent misuse analysis does
reach collusive behavior among patentees,186 business method patents more immediately impact competition because they restrict
the market behavior of existing and potential competitors.
This effect of a business method patent can be illustrated by a
modification of the above example. Assume that a patent was issued to Circuit City on its method of selling computers. Would
patent counsel to a sporting goods retailer be able to write an opinion letter assuring that retailer’s management of no exposure to liability for infringement in the following circumstances? Assume
further that the client/sporting goods retailer receives a letter from
counsel to Circuit City advising that the computer terminal kiosk
used to order custom-made skis was infringing Circuit City’s patented method of direct sale and distribution. In this circumstance
Circuit City could challenge the direct sales method not only of
competing electronic device sellers, but also of vendors of items
185. See infra text accompanying notes 198; see also In Lasercomb Am., Inc. v.
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding copyright misuse in license provisions
promising not to develop competing products and to pay royalties beyond the statutory
duration of the copyright).
186. See United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
aff’d, 32 U.S. 319 (1947).
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not presently being sold by Circuit City, as well as sellers of items
unrelated to the electronics business.
Enforcement of the business method patent in the State Street
Bank case, unless coupled with price-fixing, tying, or other anticompetitive conduct, would not invoke any of the traditional patent
misuse doctrines categories.187 Accordingly, the misuse doctrine
would not be readily at hand as a limiting principle for business
method patents. Adaptation of patent misuse principles to business
method patents would require substantial judicial innovation.
In the current state of its development, patent misuse doctrines
only bar actions indirectly affecting competitors through transactions not directly involving marketing methods.188 The prior ski
distribution example makes this point. Patent misuse would bar the
ski manufacturer (holding a patent on the ski) from controlling the
resale price of the skis,189 from claiming royalties from a licenseemanufacturer (on a patented ski feature) beyond the term of the
patent,190 from requiring the retailer to purchase an unpatented article as a condition of the license to resell the patented skis,191 from
conditioning the license to resell on a promise not to deal with a
competitor,192 from refusing to license patents individually, but
only in a bundle,193 and from charging differential royalties to
competing licensees so as to impair licensee competition.194 Since
none of these limitations would be directly applicable to the example posed above, the need for judicial innovation would seem to be
required.

187. See, e.g., Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW 704, 707
(1996).
188. Id.
189. See United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
190. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Meehan v. PPG Industries, 802
F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1986).
191. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
192. See Dubuit v. Harwell Enterprise, 336 F. Supp. 1184 (D.N.C. 1971).
193. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Corp., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (bundle
licensing permitted if done for convenience, absent coercion).
194. Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193 (D.Wash. 1966); LaPeyre v. F.T.C.,
366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that differential royalties may constitute both patent misuse and an unfair method of competition in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act).
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A judge undertaking the task of adapting existing patent misuse
principles to the new task would encounter a further complication.
Since the 1980’s there has been a debate among judges as to the
very foundation of patent misuse as a body of rules. On the one
side, Judge Richard Posner has written that refinements of antitrust
analysis should absorb and supersede the traditional doctrine of
patent misuse.195 As he explained:
The [patent misuse] doctrine arose before there was any
significant body of federal antitrust law, and reached maturity long before that law. . .attained its present scope.
Since the antitrust laws as currently interpreted reach every
practice that could impair competition substantially, it is
not easy to define a separate role for a doctrine also designed to prevent an anticompetitive practice—the abuse of
a patent monopoly.196
In the Federal Circuit, there was initially a split on this issue.197
One 1986 opinion of the Federal Circuit seemingly agreed with
Judge Posner, explaining that, “[r]ecent economic analysis questions the rationale of holding any licensing practice per se anticompetitive.”198 In a later opinion that year, however, the court
said that a Supreme Court ruling would be required in order for
lower courts to abandon patent misuse as an independent doctrine,
stating, “[w]e are bound. . .to adhere to existing Supreme Court
guidance in this area. . . .”199
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit moved toward the Posner position in Mallinckrodt.200 There, the Federal Circuit upheld a “single use” label on a refillable medical device sold by the manufacturer to a hospital.201 In reversing the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for the defendant hospital which breached the
condition, Judge Newman characterized the lower court’s opinion
195. USM v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
196. Id. at 511.
197. See, e.g., Windsurfing International v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffert, 803 F.2d. 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
198. Windsurfing International, 782 F.2d at 1001, n.9 (1986).
199. Senza-Gel Corp., 803 F.2d at 665, n.5 (1986).
200. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
201. Id. at 708.
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as mistakenly resting on patent misuse.202 In her opinion, she reasoned that antitrust principles had “trumped” the long standing
“first sale” doctrine.203 As she stated, “[t]he appropriate question
is whether Mallinckrodt’s restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent
grant. . .into. . .having an anti-competitive effect not justifiable under the rule of reason.”204
The Mallinckrodt decision can be interpreted as expressing a
preference for the Posner position because the court’s rationale
draws on antitrust precedent unrelated to patent litigation.205 This
opinion also can be viewed as reaching for the antitrust rule of reason analysis to vacate the “first sale” doctrine, a long-standing,
limiting principle of patent jurisprudence and one which is
grounded on misuse principles.206 Accordingly, there is little reason to anticipate that this panel of the Federal Circuit will undertake to apply patent misuse principles to limit the scope of business
method patents in the near future.
Recently, the existence of an independent patent misuse doctrine was dealt another diminishing blow by the Joint Department
of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Guidelines.207 In undertaking to clarify the significance of intellectual property rights in antitrust analysis, the Guidelines clearly reject any role for an independent set of patent misuse principles as follows:

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 708 (emphasis added); see also, Richard H. Stern, The Unobserved Demise of the Exhaustion Doctrine in U.S. Patent Law, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 460
(1993) (criticizing the opinion); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Bauer &
Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16 (1913) (announcing the first sale or exhaustion doctrine—the first sale permits the vendee to resell the patented item free of any conditions
imposed by the patentee); the same analysis was applied to a copyright in Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
205. Judge Newman cites Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977), for
its holding that vertical restraints are to be judged as antitrust violations under the rule of
reason. However, that case involved territorial restraints in the distribution of unpatented
products. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706.
206. Id.
207. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES
(April 6, 1995), issued jointly by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission.
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The agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to
conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to
conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible
property. . . . Intellectual property has important characteristics. . . that distinguish it from many other forms of property. These characteristics can be taken into account by
standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not require
the application of fundamentally different principles.208
CONCLUSION
The broad sweep of the State Street Bank opinion remains a
cause for concern. The doctrinal justification for such a reversal of
the traditional treatment of business methods remains obscure,
while the institutional impetus for expansion of patent protection is
already apparent.209 This imbalance between justification and burgeoning use poses a dilemma for the decision-makers involved.
While the PTO seems to have fully accepted the State Street Bank
decision as a platform for the expansion of the grant of such patents, courts and perhaps Congress may yet perceive the need for
restraint. For, despite the State Street Bank panel’s sweeping, unqualified rejection of the business method exception, caution is
warranted. By failing to provide a rationale upon which a workable
regime of such patents could be administered, the decision leaves
considerable doubt as to the wisdom of rejecting the prior business
method exception. Contemplation of some likely scenarios of the
expansive protection of business methods among competitors does
little to dispel the conclusion that the prior rule of exception, albeit
inarticulate, did represent practical wisdom akin to an efficacious
home remedy. Business method patents are so closely linked to interactive market emulation as to distinguish them from the results
of laboratory/experimental activity. In these circumstances, a careful case by case analysis of business method claims is warranted.
Courts should recognize the distinctive nature of business

208. Id. at § 2.0 (emphasis added).
209. See “Boom” supra note 7 (reporting a “boom” in business method patents
which followed the State Street decision). See also, supra text following note 155 and
supra pp. 64-67 for a description of some recent patents.
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methods in terms of both origin and function. Business method
patents pose a direct restraint on the conduct of competitors, actual
and potential. The effect of the decision in the State Street Bank
case is to announce patent protection without any suggestion of
limitation. This decision is most disturbing for its lack of an organizing principle. It rejects the old rule and only suggests a need for
the added incentive of patent protection. While it is inviting to interpret the text of section 101 to include every aspect of human
creativity, competitive markets are an arena in which such an interpretation will not work well.210 Business methods differ from
the bulk of patent claims in that business methods are developed in
the arena of competition, rather than in a laboratory environment.
Interactive emulation more than innovation is the driving force of
business method changes. Insensitivity to this feature of business
methods leads to a failure to strike the proper balance between the
incentive/reward attributes of a patent and its potential for a monopoly, i.e. “competition-dampening uses.”211 Without some constraints, patents on business methods can become the source of
multiplying royalty claims and burgeoning infringement litigation.
Such claims can impede rather than induce competitive conduct;
the resulting transaction costs are likely to impinge negatively on
consumer welfare.
Because this decision unleashed this new rule without analysis
or explanation, it remains for courts, practitioners, and commentators to undertake the necessary adjustments required by the distinctive nature of this subject matter. Minimizing the potentially anticompetitive effects of business method patents noted in the examples above will require the application of some doctrines of limitation. As presently constituted and interpreted, patent law does not
readily provide such doctrines. In contrast with the Copyright
Act,212 the Patent Act lacks defined limits on protectible subject
matter.213 As noted earlier, the antitrust doctrine of patent misuse
is not a likely source of limiting principles.214 While it is beyond

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
See supra note 7 for a statement of the dual economic attributes of patents.
17 U.S.C §1 et seq.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindenheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (C.A.9 1990) (holding copyright
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the present scope to develop such doctrines, it is possible to suggest some approaches. Copyright law offers several guides. For
example, commonplace phrases (verbal or digital), factual/historical material, and trivial contribution are by case law excluded as protectible subject matter of copyright.215 These restrictions might translate into barring minor variations on traditional
methods of delivery of products and of services from business
method patent protection. Similarly, section 102(b) of the Copyright Act excepts from protection, “any procedure, process, system
[and] method of operation.”216 This limitation might be transposed
to bar from patent protection recognized methods of accomplishing
transactions. Thus, minor variations of established direct selling
methods would not gain protection based solely on the mode of
execution or on being applied to a new product or service. Such
judicially-crafted limits could be developed on a case by case basis, were judges persuaded of the need for them. Such adjustments
are not likely in the short run.
More immediate limits can be procedural. For the reasons
noted above, courts would do well to limit severely the grant of injunctive relief in these cases and to invoke the language of the
State Street Bank decision prospectively, “business methods have
been, and should have been subject to the same legal requirements
for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”217
protects author’s expression, and facts and ideas are not protected); see also, Pecarsky v.
American Broadcasting Co., 603 F.Supp. 688 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding news reporter’s
facts are not protected by copyright law).
215. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
216. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1994).
217. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d. at 1375. The perversity of granting patent protection to incremental variations in sales methods is illustrated by the injunction issued recently by District Court Judge Marsha J. Pechman in Seattle. This injunction barred Barnesandnoble.com from executing retail purchases on the Internet by “one click
ordering,” the technique now common whereby a customer having previously registered
with the vendor, clicks on a single button on the screen to order an item. Amazon.com,
the plaintiff, had previously patented this “one click” method. Seemingly acknowledging
the limited scope of the Amazon patent, the Judge wrote, “The evidence indicates that
Barnesandnoble.com can modify its . . . [one click] feature with relative ease.” In response, the chief executive of Barnesandnoble.com stated that the company would institute a new feature next year in which a button would appear on the screen next to a book
title, by clicking on this button, the customer would see several options of payment and
delivery. Clicking on any one of these buttons completes the order.
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Computer-assisted methods of solving business problems should
not become a shield against applying all of the Patent Act requirements to business method claims.

See, New York Times, Dec. 3, 1999, at C24, col. 1.

